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Introduction  
This document has been prepared by those listed above on behalf of the International Centre for 
Infrastructure Futures (ICIF) in response to an open consultation on the National Infrastructure 
Commission seeking views on the governance, structure and operation of the Commission. The 
consultation document was issued on 7th January 2016 by HM Treasury, National Infrastructure 
Commission and The Rt Hon Greg Hands MP.  
The document responds to questions 1 to 15 of the consultation.  Each response is accompanied by 
a note highlighting any relevant caveats or assumptions, together with additional detail and 
rationale to support the position.   
  
Summary of Cross Cutting Themes from Consultation Response 
 The significant degree of interdependencies involved in infrastructure provision and 
operation must be taken into account (See response to Question 1, 13, 14 and 15); 
 The relationships between the National Infrastructure Commission (NIC) and other 
infrastructure stakeholders (e.g. government departments, regulators, infrastructure 
operators and suppliers) must be governed in an open and collaborative way.  The credibility 
of the NIC depends on the nature of these relationships, its objectivity, independence and 
the quality and transparency of its methodologies (see responses to Questions 1, 3, 5, 6, 7, 
8, 12, 13, 14 and 15); 
 Groups of actors and activities that fall outside the remit of the UK government play an 
increasing role in the way that society and its economy creates and captures value from 
infrastructure.  This should be reflected in the National Infrastructure Commission’s 
mandate and process of work to include broader understanding of cost, benefits, 
methodologies and criteria for assessment (see response to Questions 4,7, 9, 10 and 11); 
 The National Infrastructure Assessment (NIA) should be systemic and framed within an 
understanding of the high-level outcomes valued by society and an articulation of the 
nation’s needs that is neutral to the specific solutions through which they will be fulfilled. 
(see responses to Questions 1, 7 and 8)  
 A holistic set of criteria should be used to evaluate the relative merits of possible options to 
address the fundamental infrastructure need.  These criteria may comprise both economic 
and non-economic objectives, possible criteria include: whole lifecycle cost (TOTEX), the 
expected value of the flow of benefits over an infrastructure lifecycle, the ability to 
contribute to broader system-level goals (e.g. increased system resilience, carbon mitigation, 
system adaptation to the impacts of climate change, the management of water flow at the 
catchment level and inclusiveness of access and fairness in terms of benefit and value 
distribution) (see responses to Questions 8 and 9) 
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Consultation Questions 
 
1) Do you agree that the National Infrastructure Commission should be 
established as a non-departmental public body via primary legislation? 
Answer: Yes 
Note: None  
Detail and Rationale: We wholeheartedly agree that the credibility of the National Infrastructure 
Commission (NIC) will partially be derived through being independent of government and any 
individual government department (3.1). The NIC will also derive credibility from the quality of the 
methodologies and processes it implements to undertake its responsibilities, the quality and 
openness of the relationships it builds with important stakeholders, its ability to access and engage 
with high quality objective research and evidence and to independently commission such research 
where it believes necessary.   
Additionally, we agree that independence is vital if the NIC is to: 
 Build relationships with stakeholders at a range of levels including government departments, 
sub-national and regional bodies and regulators (1.5); 
 Advise on complex, long-term, cross sectoral, systemic issues (2.2); 
 ‘facilitate a better quality of discussion on future infrastructure projects’ (2.2); 
 ‘promote a more consensual approach to policy making and create a co-ordinated structure 
for an ongoing dialogue between politicians, government, industry and the public’ (1.6); 
 Facilitate the emergence of political consensus through its recommendations (2.3). 
If established as a non-departmental public body the NIC will be able to foster a collaborative 
approach among government departments.  This is particularly important in the light of the 
emerging recognition for the interdependencies between infrastructures across multiple sectors that 
fall under the governance of diverse government departments.  It is particularly important when 
planning new infrastructures as their net effects are strongly related to the nature and performance 
of legacy infrastructures.  New advances in technologies for road driving, renewable energy sources, 
and information economics are just a few of the trends that support the need for the NIC to adopt 
an interdependency infrastructure paradigm.   
An opportunity to recognise and take advantage of the high level of interdependency between 
infrastructures and cities is now ripe for the taking. We agree with Moss Kanter1 who recently 
remarked in relation to the necessity of changing government silos that “to avoid getting stymied by 
silos reorganization…A compelling vision needs to connect actions to a clear set of goals”.  As an 
independent, non-departmental public-body, the NIC would be well placed to articulate this vision 
grounded in its broad understanding of infrastructure needs.  Therefore we agree that the NIC needs 
to be independent if it is to fulfil the various elements of its remit to:  
                                                             
1 Moss-Kanter, R. (2015). Move. W.W. Norton & Company: New York. 
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 Develop, implement and refine an ‘overarching and independent process for assessing the 
long-term infrastructure needs of the nation’ (1.4);  
 Produce a clear, transparent analysis of what infrastructure is needed (today and in the 
future); what the key trade-offs and dependencies are; and how these needs can best be 
met. (2.3)  
Moreover, we agree it is necessary that the Commission should not be responsible for delivering the 
infrastructure it recommends (2.8) and believe independence from such responsibility is important 
to maintain objectivity when implementing needs assessment methodology.  
 
2) Do you agree that the commission’s National Infrastructure Assessments 
should be laid before Parliament and that the government must respond 
within a specific timeframe? What would an appropriate timeframe be? 
Answer: Yes   
Note: With the information currently available a specific time-frame in which the government should 
respond is stated here with some reservation.   
Detail and Rationale: The Commission’s National Infrastructure Assessment (NIA) should be laid 
before Parliament and the government should provide a formal and explicit response to each of the 
recommendations set out in the assessment.   
As described in paragraph 4.8 of the consultation document, this response should describe how the 
accepted recommendations will be implemented.  If the government disagrees with the 
recommendations the response should describe the alternative strategy intended to meet the 
identified needs.  If the government disagrees with the identified needs then the response should 
set out their alternative assessment, providing the appropriate evidence to support the alternative 
position.  Regardless of the scenario, the government’s response should also include the means by 
which the strategy’s efficacy and efficiency to meet the acknowledged needs will be monitored.    
As set out in paragraph 4.10 of the consultation document, accepted recommendations should be 
considered government policy.    
In general terms the response should be made in such a way as to avoid unduly delaying the 
implementation of any critical recommendations.  The sensible period of response may be dictated 
by the nature of specific needs and recommendations.  Responses may be required on a case-by-
case basis as urgency dictates.    
Taking into account the prior recommendations of the Armitt Review, the critical nature of some 
infrastructure decisions, and the purpose of the Commission to counter the fact that a “lack of 
consensus on the need for specific project has slowed down delivery” (para 1.4), a timeframe in the 
region of three months would seem appropriate.  A significantly longer period would unduly hold up 
progress in developing the detailed strategies to address the recommendations and would be 
counterproductive to the aims of the Commission.   
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3) Do you agree that it should not be mandatory for the government to lay 
the recommendations from specific studies before Parliament, but that 
the government should have discretion to do so where necessary?  
Answer: No 
Note: None 
Detail and Rationale: We strongly believe the credibility of the NIC is contingent on its 
recommendations, and justification of how it has reached these, being laid before Parliament. This 
requirement should apply as strongly to specific studies as it does the NIA (Question 2).  Therefore, 
in the interest of transparency, all specific study reports should be laid before Parliament. The 
independent purpose of the NIC is best served by treating any recommendations it makes equally, 
rather than treating NIC analysis selectively. Therefore, we argue that it should be mandatory for 
recommendations made from specific studies by the NIC to be laid before Parliament.   
Additionally, we raise a slight concern regarding the framing of paragraph 4.3 within the 
consultation that states: “The terms of reference for these studies will be set by the government’…. 
As well as defining the issue to be addressed, the terms of reference may provide fiscal and 
economic guidance within which the commission should make its recommendations.”   
This could be interpreted as contradicting paragraph 3.1: “The commission’s legal form will be 
central to ensuring its independence and credibility, and will also have implications for its powers, 
funding and staff. The commission should be able to work independently of government 
departments, within its remit and the guidelines set by the government.”   
We strongly believe that the independence of the NIC is a source of credibility for its 
recommendations (Question 1). Therefore, there is a risk that by asking the NIC to undertake specific 
commissions based on terms of reference imposed upon it - and further constrained by fiscal and 
economic guidance regarding what recommendations can be made - will undermine that credibility 
with ramifications for all NIC recommendations made in specific commissions and in the National 
Infrastructure Assessment. It follows that all specific commission requests must be transparent, such 
that the original terms of engagement are visible to all, and flexible, such that the NIC has the 
freedom to frame the scope of specific commissions as it feels necessary in order to protect the 
independence of the processes it uses to undertake its work.  
 
4) Do you agree that economic regulators should ‘have regard’ to Endorsed 
Recommendations?   
Answer: Yes 
Note: The answer to this question is without prejudice to the legal significance of the term to ‘have 
regard’ and what that entails.  
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Detail and Rationale: Economic regulators should have regard to Endorsed Recommendations, (as 
according to the definition provided in the consultation document Endorsed Recommendations are 
recommendations accepted by the government that should be considered to be government policy). 
However, there are several pertinent caveats to this question. Considering that the government can 
choose different means for delivering Endorsed Recommendations, which may not include 
regulation (but involve measures such as market stimulation) the question might be interpreted as: 
Should economic regulators have regard to Endorsed Recommendations whose implementation 
does not entail regulatory measures?   
We believe that Endorsed Recommendations should be regarded by economic regulators: (1) even if 
they are not implemented through the use of regulatory measures, and; (2) that the principle of 
‘regard’ should apply beyond economic regulators and include other relevant groups (including 
businesses and civil society) as well.  
The highly interdependent nature of infrastructure provision in the UK is well-recognised in 
research2,3,4 and involves decision making, governance mechanisms and action across multiple 
sectors, levels and actors. For example, Endorsed Recommendations in the case of low carbon 
network innovation and smart grids development would involve several sectors (including electricity, 
ICT and road transport) and economic regulators (Ofgem, Ofcom, ORR) with varying degrees of 
regulation and regulatory approaches. Therefore, changes implemented in one sector (such as the 
removal of financial market incentives and the introduction of new regulatory rules) will have an 
effect on another. Furthermore, policy support (for example funding) of cross-sectoral technologies 
and processes such as innovation may be anchored in one focal sector, leading to a spill-over to 
other interconnected sectors. For example in the UK, the electricity sector is considered critical to 
smart grid policy, while the ICT sector is considered as a newcomer and government funding (like the 
Low Carbon Network Fund (LCNF)) is thus made available only to electricity distribution network 
operators (DNOs)5.  A lack of similar investment in the ICT sector acts as an entry barrier to low 
carbon innovation for SMEs, therefore excluding some of the most innovative solutions.   
Applying Endorsed Recommendations to economic regulators only, can reproduce and reinforce 
long standing policy silos between different economic regulators, as well as silos between economic 
and environmental regulation. This silo approach can lead to conflicting and suboptimal responses. 
For example, changes in environmental regulation in the water sector in the UK post-privatisation 
drove demand for electricity in the water sector upwards, which many water companies tried to 
meet by investing in renewable technologies such as solar and wind. However, investment in 
renewable technologies by water utilities ceased in 2010 when changes in carbon accounting policy 
ceased offsetting carbon emissions by purchasing renewable energy via ‘green tariffs6’.   
                                                             
2 Hall, J,Tran, M., Hickford, A. and Nicholls, R.  (2016) The Future of National Infrastructure: A System-of-systems approach, Cambridge Press 
3 Hiteva, R., Lovell, K., McArthur, J., Smith, H. and Zerjav, V. (2016) “Emerging approaches and issues in regulation and governance of 
infrastructure based services”, the International Centre for Infrastructure Futures White Pape 
4 Carhart, N. and G Rosenberg (2016) ‘A Framework for Characterising Infrastructure Interdependencies’. International Journal of 
Complexity in Applied Science and Technology 
5 Hiteva, R. and J. Watson, (2016) Governance of multi-regime interactions in the case of smart grids in the UK, SPRU Working Paper 
6 Watson, J. and Rai, N. (2013) Governance interdependencies between the UK water and electricity sectors, Working Paper, 
ITRC/University of Sussex 
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A lot of areas involved in the delivery of infrastructure services are also not regulated, or are partially 
subject to regulation. Some of them might also be involved in non-traditional business models for 
infrastructure services. Business models generally describe how firms create value, capture value 
and then monetize a proportion of that value (internally and externally). There is a growing 
recognition of the utilisation of what Ofgem terms ‘non-traditional business models’ (NTBMs), 
particularly in the case of energy, describing business models that differ from conventional forms of 
generation, distribution and supply. Examples of NTBMs could include municipal energy 
management and Energy Service Companies (ESCOs), as well as non-traditional value creation 
activities such as volunteering and sharing. Since NTBMs can cross sector boundaries and include 
areas that are not regulated by Ofgem, NTBMs may not be immediately visible to or fully contained 
within the remit of the electricity regulator. 
 
5) Do you agree that the government should legislate to oblige the 
commission to produce National Infrastructure Assessments once in every 
Parliament? 
Answer: Yes 
Note: None  
Detail and Rationale: Given the arguments presented in the consultation, especially those contained 
within paragraph 4.2, it is clear that a primary value adding role of the Commission is to act as 
constant and independent horizon-scanning steward for the UK, or those countries that will form 
part of the Union in the future, in terms of the integrated suite of infrastructure systems and 
networks that our country will need and depend upon. Whilst it is it for the people and their elected 
representatives to decide which elements to decide to have or not have and how to pay, it is clear 
that we need those who can maintain a long-term and independent viewpoint to consider not the 
immediacy of our problems and issues, but what may well become our challenges in the decades to 
come. We have seen examples in this country where forward thinking has provided us with 
infrastructure that has served the nation well for generations beyond that envisaged by the original 
designers and equally, where we have become moribund in discussion and bureaucratic process 
allowing chronic and then acute infrastructure problems to occur. 
To charge the Commission with the production of an NIA would require there to be the setting of a 
point of achievement of difference, akin to the Carbon Reduction Commitment (CRC) set for 2050. 
The CRC is clear and unequivocal. With it stated we, as a nation, should now be able to say how we 
are doing against this CRC. Yet we have no infrastructure equivalent to the CRC and, assuming that 
we address this, it is clear that such stretching and demanding objectives should be routinely 
assessed, and assessed with sufficient rigour to allow those accountable for progress and 
performance to both defend their record and take any and all appropriate action as necessary.   
It would be beneficial if the methodology used to undertake the NIA is robust, transparent, peer 
reviewed and clearly auditable. However, whilst ensuring direct comparability between NIA is 
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important, each NIA should learn from the experiences of the previous iteration. Therefore, NIA 
methodology need to be sufficiently flexible to allow this learning to take place. 
6) Do you agree that the precise timing of reports any interim publications 
should be a matter for the commission in consultation with relevant 
departments? 
Answer: Yes  
Note: None  
Detail and Rationale: Given that the Commission will be required to produce an NIA once per 
Parliament (see Question 5) there will be the expectation that the Commission will also be 
conducting parallel work on a series of more short-term projects that will generate various outputs. 
These should be produced as and when appropriate and following dialogue and discussion with the 
various departments, agencies and other government-related organisations that the Commission 
will need to liaise with. It would seem both appropriate and indeed best practice for the Commission 
to want to establish a productive working relationship with these departments and similar bodies as 
the nature of infrastructure is enduring and whilst the nature of each report is likely to be specific 
and non-repeating, the accumulation of these publications over time, and the conduct of the 
Commission in producing them, will set the tone for how infrastructure as a topic is considered 
within and between these departments and similar bodies. Thus, there is much need for a policy of 
good conduct by the Commission when it comes to consultation with the relevant departments. 
 
7) Do you agree that a GDP envelope would provide the most effective fiscal 
remit for the commission? 
Answer: No 
Note: None 
Detail and Rationale: It is our belief that the question of fiscal remit is not aligned with the purpose 
of the NIC in undertaking the NIA.  The NIA should focus on the identification and definition of 
infrastructure need (both current and future), not on the advocacy of specific infrastructure 
solutions.  We, therefore, believe that the NIC should consider undertaking three core actions when 
conducting the NIA: 
i. Identifying and understanding desired outcomes (those benefits that we expect 
infrastructure to play a role in enabling, and therefore that gives infrastructure its purpose);  
ii. Evaluating need (the difference between current + planned provision and expectations of 
what infrastructure should enable); 
iii. Identification, evaluation and selection of solutions. 
 
We argue that of these actions (i) and (ii) are the most important when evaluating the 10-30 year 
horizon expected of the NIA. This is because (i) aligns the purpose of infrastructure with the 
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outcomes required by society, and (ii) evaluates need in terms of that definition of infrastructure 
purpose given by (i).  It follows that the credibility of any recommendations made by action (iii) is 
based upon the use of robust, transparent, peer reviewed, clearly auditable methodologies being 
applied to evaluate (i) and (ii).   
Furthermore, a robust, risk-based understanding of current and projected infrastructure need is a 
better output for the NIC to aspire to than a pipeline of infrastructure solutions (similar to that in the 
current NIP), therefore, (i) and (ii) should be the fundamental focus of the NIA.   
Both an articulation of needs and a pipeline of future infrastructure projects would signpost future 
activities and so provide greater certainty to all involved with infrastructure provision.  However, a 
pipeline of planned infrastructure projects has a number of disadvantages compared to a robust 
articulation of infrastructure needs: (a) it dictates the solution to a need without reference to the 
context into which that solution will be introduced 5 to 30 years after the solution was originally 
identified; (b) it places responsibility for the identification of solutions in the public sector, and; (c) it 
serves to stifle innovation by selecting solutions at an early stage in the design lifecycle.  By contrast, 
an articulation of needs, by not specifying the expected solution, creates clear signposts to solution 
providers that a solution to a certain need will be required at a specific time in the future. This 
creates an incentive for innovation in the formation of possible solutions.  
Therefore, given the importance of (i) and (ii) and the relative merits of an articulation of current 
and future need over those of a pipeline of solutions, we suggest that NIC when undertaking NIA 
should primarily focus on framing infrastructure need, and a fiscal remit should only apply if needed 
when undertaking (iii). 
 
8) Do you agree that a transparency requirement should be placed on the 
commission with regard to its economic remit? 
 
Answer: Yes 
Note: None 
Detail and Rationale: We strongly agree that the Commission should be as transparent as possible in 
all the activities it undertakes. We believe that operating in a transparent and open manner will give 
the NIC the credibility it needs to fulfil its remit. In this way transparency is as important as 
independence and many of the points raised in response to Question 1 apply here. 
However, we are slightly concerned with the wording of this question. We agree about the need for 
a transparency requirement, but feel the question implies our agreement with the need for an 
economic remit.  For similar reasons to the doubts we raised about the fiscal remit in Question 7, we 
feel an economic remit is only relevant to NIC work concerned with identification, evaluation and 
selection of solutions (point iii in response to question 7) and is not necessary for NIC work focused 
on identifying and understanding desired outcomes or evaluating infrastructure need (points i and ii 
in response to question 7). 
ICIF Response to National Infrastructure Commission Consultation 
11 
We believe that if an economic remit is applied, it should not constrain the Commission from 
considering the full range of possible solutions to a stated infrastructure need. Solutions should be 
evaluated against a more holistic set of criteria than solely capital costs (CAPEX), these might include 
but are not limited to: cost over the whole lifecycle (TOTEX), the value of the flow of benefits the 
infrastructure is expected to enable over its lifetime, the ability of a solution to contribute to 
broader system-level goals such as increased system resilience, carbon mitigations, system 
adaptation to the impacts of climate change, and the management of water flow at the catchment 
level. Similarly, as an output from NIC work, it is important that the ability to frame underlying need 
in terms of higher level system objectives such as those listed is developed.  
 
9) Do you think that any additional constraints are necessary to deliver the 
commission’s anticipated benefits to consumers? 
 
Answer: Yes 
Note: We favour framing them as areas where the NIC will have a duty of care rather than 
constraints.  The presumed benefits to consumers are also unclear from the consultation document.   
Detail and Rationale: There are a number of issues of non-economic character that NIC should be 
obliged to take into account in order to deliver benefits to consumers, however these should not be 
necessarily described as “constraints” but areas where NIC should have a duty of care. The proposed 
areas are based on ensuring fairness, inclusiveness, environmental protection, acceptance and 
resilience.  The duty of care for the NIC should involve avoiding actions such as putting forward 
recommendations of a regressive nature, which will adversely affect the most vulnerable groups of 
users (such as the elderly, fuel poor households, single parents, families with multiple children) or 
lead to the exclusion of already marginalised groups. The commission should be compelled to 
consider inclusiveness not only in terms of access (i.e. the provision of certain infrastructure services 
such as high-speed broadband) but also in terms of whether all groups of users will be able to gain 
value from this provision. For example, online access to infrastructure services requires the use of a 
smart appliance such as a laptop, mobile phone or tablet, as well as the knowhow of using online 
services.  The commission should uphold a standard of environmental protection in all aspects of its 
work, and environmental protection should be adopted as a benefit to consumers across the board. 
Recognising these areas as benefits to infrastructure consumers would facilitate a move away from 
focusing entirely on a traditional cost-benefit analysis of infrastructure towards a more inclusive 
interpretation of the role of consumers.  This would involve recognising that consumer values and 
their associated interpretation of the benefits derived from infrastructure often go beyond their 
immediate time horizon and concern with selecting the cheapest option for consumer bills.  Closely 
linked to these additional areas of concern for NIC and of equal importance, is imposing a 
commitment on the Commission to safeguard the resilience of communities affected by 
infrastructure, defining the scope of impact not purely in geographic terms and on the basis of 
proximity. Embedding values of engagement with groups underrepresented in infrastructure 
governance in the UK, such as users, citizens and consumers, has a great potential to contribute to 
the credibility and legitimacy of NIC’s work. 
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10) Do you agree that the remit should be set by a letter from the 
Chancellor, on behalf of the government? 
Answer: No 
Note: None 
The consultation document makes it clear how strategically important infrastructure is to the UK. 
The consultation document makes it clear that the Commission has limited its mandate to that of 
‘economic infrastructure’ (paragraph 2.9) and will not make recommendations on social 
infrastructure (paragraph 2.10). Yet this seems contradictory with the implicit argument that lies 
behind the argument presented in 1.4 that refers to ‘more efficient infrastructure systems’. The 
sentiment in this section of the consultation can easily be extended from that of the efficiency 
argument (that is to say a focus on generating outputs with a minimum amount of waste) to that of 
effectiveness (i.e. the degree to which infrastructure meets its intended objectives and works for the 
country and its people). Here having an efficient and effective infrastructure system will lead to 
assured national prosperity. In doing so, there will be an intrinsic interdependence on all forms of 
infrastructure, from the hard economic to the digital social, from the natural and green to the space 
bound and highly technological. It is for this reason that we feel, strongly, that the letter setting out 
the remit for the Commission should be written by the Prime Minister of the government, not the 
Chancellor. The Prime Minister is responsible for the country and for its entire infrastructure. The 
Prime Minister must and should write this letter.    
 
11) Do you agree that the commission’s working assumption should be to 
only review those areas of infrastructure that are the responsibility of 
the UK government? 
Answer: No 
Note: None 
Detail and Rationale: We believe that the commission should also review areas of infrastructure that 
fall outside of the direct responsibility of the UK government. As elaborated in more detail in our 
answer to Question 4, growing infrastructure interdependencies across sectors and scales, and the 
existence of non-traditional business models, point to areas, groups of actors and activities that fall 
outside of the remit of the UK government but might play an important role in the creation and 
capture of value from infrastructure by society. Therefore, we encourage the introduction of a 
certain level of flexibility when identifying the scope of areas to be reviewed, with view to include 
the broadest range of perspectives and knowledge for any given area. This will be particularly 
important in delivering non-economic benefits to consumers, as detailed in the answer to Question 
9. 
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12) Do you agree that the decision of whether to accept or reject the 
commission’s recommendations should rest with the responsible 
government? 
Answer: Yes  
Note: None 
Detail and Rationale: The Commission will be expected to take an objective, evidence-based, 
apolitical and morally ambivalent perspective on infrastructure.  This may not be popular with the 
media or politicians, but it will be beholden on the Commission to not simply state what it thinks is 
best, but to present the arguments and data on why it believes, to the best of its abilities, its position 
is in the long-term best interests on the country.  In such circumstances, where the Commission 
makes recommendations that a responsible government either agrees or disagrees with, it should 
equally rest with that government to present its case as to why it so agrees or disagrees.  To do so 
will clearly present to the electorate, media, infrastructure investors and other interested parties 
what the responsible government’s view is of infrastructure and the role it plays.  This is best 
illustrated by reference to current major decisions that are being considered, such as that of the 
expansion of airport capacity in the south-east of England, how to fund Crossrail 2 in London or 
provide the high speed – high capacity transport linking cities in northern England.  Independent 
Commissions can and will make recommendations, but governments do not have to abide by these 
recommendations.  However, it is essential for many reasons, not least for national and international 
credibility at the time and into the future, that the government handles its response to such 
recommendations in a fully considered and professional way. 
 
13) Should departments be obliged to accede to the commission’s requests 
for analysis? 
Answer: Yes 
Note: This answer is given with the assumption that a collaborative Memorandum of Understanding 
or potentially even a Memorandum of Agreement is established between the NIC and the relevant 
departments governing what is and isn’t an appropriate request.   
Detail and Rationale: A collaborative, transparent and open relationship with government 
departments and relevant agencies, as described in paragraph 6.5 of the consultation document is 
strongly endorsed.  Whether looking at specific projects or the national infrastructure system-of-
systems, access to data and information is critical.  The Commission is perhaps in a unique position 
to consider the ability of infrastructure as a whole to meet the complex and dynamic needs of the 
nation (socially, economically and environmentally).  In this way it can overcome the challenges of 
“silo-thinking” acknowledged in the Armitt Review, and the emergent risks and benefit of necessary 
and optional infrastructure interdependencies as discussed in the response to Question 1. 
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The Royal Academy of Engineering have stated that “A systems approach to infrastructure planning 
will be essential, noting the interdependencies between infrastructure sectors”7.  This is only 
possible if government departments and agencies are prepared to share their knowledge in an open 
spirit of collaboration.  The ability of the Commission to successfully meet its intended purposes, as 
set out in the consultation document, will be significantly hampered if such relationships do not 
exist.   
The notion set out in paragraph 6.6 of the consultation document, “the government intends to 
legislate to provide the commission with the right to ask departments for both data and analysis”, is 
supported, although the right to ask should be expected.    
There should be an expectation of openness and transparency around information, data and the 
conclusions of existing analyses.  Departments should be obliged to accede to requests for these.    
Were departments “obliged to accede” to all requests for analysis, then the collaborative and open 
relationships between them and the Commission may be threatened.  There should be some 
sensitivity to the imposition of a blanket obligation.  There may be challenges of resources were 
there an ambiguous obligation to accede to all requests for additional analysis.  .  
The consultation document proposes a Memoranda of Understanding between departments and 
the Commission, setting out “a common understanding of what reasonable and proportionate 
requests for data and analysis should entail” (Para 6.7).  This is critical to ensure that collaborative 
relationships are maintained.  Departments should be obliged to accede to requests for analysis 
within the expectations of this Memorandum.   
The Commission may also wish to look at alternative avenues for analysis to be conducted.   
 
14) Do you agree that the legislation used to create the commission should 
place obligations on the relevant regulators and public bodies to share 
information with the commission? 
Answer: Yes 
Note: This answer is given with the assumption that a collaborative Memorandum of Understanding 
or potentially even a Memorandum of Agreement is established between the NIC and the relevant 
regulators and public bodies governing what is and isn’t appropriate.   
Detail and Rationale: As set out in response to Question 13, a collaborative, transparent and open 
relationship with relevant agencies is strongly endorsed.  The interdependent nature of 
infrastructure requires collaboration with and across multiple government departments, regulators 
and public bodies.  The efficacy of the Commission in its ability to fulfil its remit would be threatened 
were it not able to work with all infrastructure stakeholders and fully appreciate their points of view.  
                                                             
7 Royal Academy of Engineering (2013) ‘Independent Armitt Review of Infrastructure - Submitted by The Royal Academy of Engineering to 
Sir John Armitt’ [Available Online: http://www.raeng.org.uk/publications/responses/independent-armitt-review-of-infrastructure] 
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This will require access to tacit and explicit knowledge held by the relevant organisations.  Access 
must be afforded to the Commission in a way that does not threaten the relationships between the 
concerned parties.  This requires a shared understanding and agreement over the purpose and role 
of the Commission.  
Regulators and public bodies should be obliged to respond to all requests for information from the 
Commission, and provide any information that falls within the remit of a collaboratively formed 
Memorandum of Understanding as is the proposed method for the Commission’s relationship with 
Government Departments.  This Memorandum of Understanding should embody the collective view 
of the mutually beneficial act of sharing information, and ensure the successful governance of the 
relationships.   
Obligations should be placed on the relevant regulators and public bodies to share information with 
the Commission which fall within a collectively agreed understanding of what is reasonable and 
appropriate.   
 
15) Should legislation also place obligations on the relevant regulators and 
public bodies to provide analysis for the commission? 
Answer: No 
Note: None  
Detail and Rationale: As set out in response to Question 13 and Question 14, a collaborative, 
transparent and open relationship with relevant agencies is strongly endorsed and central to these 
questions.  The Commission, together with relevant regulators and public bodies, must work to form 
a shared understanding of the role of the Commission and how collaboration and knowledge sharing 
could be mutually beneficial.  This should form the basis of the understanding between the 
organisations, and an agreed expectation for what constitutes a reasonable and proportionate 
request for analysis. 
 
16) Do you agree that the government should specify a timetable to review 
or replace a National Policy Statement when endorsing 
recommendations? 
Consideration for the timetable for reviewing National Policy Statements is felt to be outside the 
current focus of the International Centre for Infrastructure Futures, and therefore we are not in a 
position to offer a meaningful view on this at the present time.  
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17) Do you agree that, while additional consultation may be necessary, 
consultation undertaken by the commission should not be repeated by 
the Secretary of State when preparing a National Policy Statement? 
The needs of a given Secretary of State in their preparation of a National Policy Statement are 
outside the current focus of the International Centre for Infrastructure Futures, and therefore we 
are not in a position to offer a meaningful view on this question. 
 
 
